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| lacing details all filled in |
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| metallic details like buttons and bayonets are done |
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| ACW troops Painted by my eldest |
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| Marian Romans in 15mm by me |
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| GOBLINZ! |
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| Dark Elves |
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| in battle with the Goblinz and Dark Elves |
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| Russian Personalities minis by Old Glory |
The moment appeared propitious for a counteroffensive; Napoleon's impetus had largely died away, his formations were scattered around Vitebsk, and a resolute Russian advance would enable two more Russian formations, the Armies of Finland and Moldavia, both newly liberated from their previous frontier commitments by recent agreements with Sweden and Turkey, to mass in the interior preparatory to entering the campaign against the French. Accordingly, after holding a council of war on the 6th, Barclay ordered 100,000 infantry, 18,000 regular cavalry and 650 guns to move westward from Smolensk, hoping to forestall any French concentration and catch the enemy scattered and unprepared.
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| Marching Russian Columns |
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| Russia Command staff & ADC's |
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| The head of the Column with Dragoons leading the way |
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| Center of the column, Russian Guard standing in review of line troops passing on the road |
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| Four Yards of minis |
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| Pavlov Grenadiers |
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| More Pavlov Grenadiers |
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| Hussars covering the rear of the column |
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| Cossacks on flank/rear guard, town in the distance |
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| The view a French pursuit force might see of this column |
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| a semi-aerial view of the column, Dragoons at top, Guard between the roads in town, Cossacks to the right bottom, Hussars on the bottom left. |
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| Foreign Commissioners in Wellington's Headquarters |
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| New shiny metal - French uniforms for Italians in green |
... when the French advanced in full panoply of battle on the morning of the 28th, they fount Vitebsk in its turn evacuated by the elusive foe.
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| only little specs in the distance from town |
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| the view of town from the eagle atop the Guard flagpole |
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| Lancers Polonais in the sunshine |
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| Napoleon Bonaparte and staff, looking at a missed opportunity |
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| 25mm Cossack on the cover of David Chandler's Master Work |
In addition to wasting and ever-increasing proportion of French manpower, the elusive Russian tactics also contributed to the mental as well as physical exhaustion of Napoleon's forces. Tip and run raids by small bands of Cossacks were continuous and exercised a baleful influence far in excess of the military danger they represented. The French army became increasingly subject to fits of the jitters. Captain Roeder noted one typical example in his diary. The Hessian troops were mustering for parade before the Emperors quarters at Vietebsk on August 17, when "Everything was suddenly thrown into ridiculous uproar because a few Cossacks had been sighted, who were said to have carried off a forager. The entire garrison sprang to arms, and when the had ridden out it was discovered that we were really surrounded by only a few dozen Cossacks who were dodging about hither and thither. In this way they were able to bring the whole garrison to hospital in about fourteen days without losing a single man." The Cossacks enjoyed a very high opinion of their martial qualities. Shortly before Borodino a prisoner informed Napoleon that "If Alexander's Russian soldiers were like the Cossacks, you and your Frenchmen would not be in Russia. If Napoleon had Cossacks in his army he would have been Emperor in China long ago. It is the Cossacks who do all the fighting; it is always their turn." However the individual Cossack was not so imposing an adversary when met in single combat, and man for man the French light cavalryman was probably superior. But in a harassing elusive role, the men of the Don valley had no equal.
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| French Advance into Russia, first stage of 1812 |
On the eve of Operations in June 1812, the various army groups had occupied a start line of a little over 250 miles (Konigsberg to Lublin). In little more than six weeks, the front-line forces had become extended into a huge arrowhead running from Riga to Vitebsk and thence towards Bobruisk and the Pripet Marshes. Even excluding Schwarzenberg and Reynier, Operating around Lutsk far to the southwest of the rest of the army, the main French front extended for well over 500 miles. Thus Napoleon's resources were becoming decidedly strung out, and the strategic consumption of manpower was already serious. By the time he reached Smolensk in mid August, the effective fighting strength of his central army group had been reduced to 156,000. In the month that followed this figure was to shrink still further, amounting to only 95,000 by the time Moscow was occupied; and all the time the French lines of communication were inevitably becoming more and more extended, placing an ever heavier load on the shoulders of the overworked supply battalions and calling for numerous garrison detachments for the protection of the staging points and extended flanks. Whether or not the Russian policy of denying battle and drawing Napoleon ever further into the midst of Russia was the result of deliberate planning or dictated by the course of events, it undoubtedly weakened the Grande Armee to a mere shadow of its original battle power.
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| Barclay de Tolly |
The pace of events began to quicken. On the 23rd Davout was engaged in a sharp action against Bagration at Mohilev and succeeded in denying the Russians passage northward; that is to say, the French were still successfully interposing their troops between the two Russian armies. The 24th saw Napoleon at Biechenkovski, carrying out a personal reconnaissance of the further bank of the Dvina; that same day a handful of captured Russian stragglers confirmed that Barclay was in person at Vitebsk. The uncertainty was now over. During the night the French set off for Vitebsk along the Dvina's left bank, still intent on forcing a battle on an unreinforced Barclay. On the 25th and 26th Napoleon really believed that this had at last materialized; on both days Murat's cavalry was engaged with Russian forces at Ostronovo, and the belief grew that the foe was indeed courting battle. Convinced that Barclay was now at his mercy, Napoleon withstood the temptation to attack at once with the forces at hand, and ordered his troops to wait for one day to allow reinforcements to close up.
This delay was the Emperor's great mistake; it is true that Barclay had originally intended to face the French at Vitebsk, but when he learned that there was no longer any chance of Bagration moving up through Orsha (owing to Davout's successful blocking action at Mohilev), he changed his mind and decided to slip away toward a new rendezvous at Smolensk. By delaying his attack for the space of one day, Napoleon unwittingly gave Barclay the chance to get clear; consequently, when the French advanced in full panoply of battle on teh morning of the 28th, they found Vitebsk in its turn evacuated by the elusive foe. And so Napoleon experienced his second disappointment of the campaign; twice the neck of the strategic net had been pulled tight, but on each occasion the prey had narrowly eluded capture.
There was now little chance of catching Barclay this side of Smolensk; there were too many good roads for his army to use. Similarly, there was little hope of preventing Bagration from making a successful rendezvous with his collegue. Napoleon's strategy had come to naught, and he failed to force a decisive engagement on a divided foe. He could hardly console himself with the knowledge that he had inflicted some 8,000 casualties on the foe and had been in possession of "the principal military position in Europe." There was no disguising the fact that the Grande Armee had worn itself to a shadow in the process. The weather was excessively hot, and the number of sick had risen alarmingly; the loss of horses had been particularly severe. The route of the army was marked with putrefying corpses which undoubtedly served to raise the sickness rate.
~D. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon; p. 799
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| Cover of the Autumn 2003 Arcadian Guild Quarterly |
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| summary of the re-fight of Salamanca from Autumn 2003 AGQ |
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| a parchment version of the map used in today's refight of Salamanca |
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| tabletop terrain and troops laid out 2' x 3' |
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| Artillery in a duel |
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| raging artillery duel continued while British cavalry cut up their French counterparts |
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| British and Portuguese cavalry fall back, having lost 1/3 of their forces, meanwhile the French cannot get any effective fire into their counter attacks |
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| new French command is temporarily disordered from artillery fire (spiral marker) |
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| with only 3rd battalions of infantry to cover the left flank the French were obliged to start withdrawl |
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| when was the last time you searched your 'lead mound'? |
Napoleon believed that Barclay would now make his own way down the Orsha road to hasten the junction with his colleague, and accordingly all units were ordered to concentrate at Kamen, ready to fight the long-sought battle.
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| Napoleon considers his next move. |
Once again, however, the Emperor's intuition proved wrong. True, the Russians were straining every nerve to reunite thier forces, but their designated place of meeting was Vitebsk, and not Polotsk as had hitherto been assumed by Napoleon. By the 21st he had recognized his error, whereupon he ordered his troops to move from Kamen to Biechenkovski, which they were to reach by the 24th. But nothing appeared certain. "Will the foe come to Biechenkovski or move straight to Vitebsk?" he asked himself in a letter to Eugene.
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| bare metal to fully painted in one week 52 Dutch Infantry |
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| Battle of Maloyaroslavets October 12, 1812 |
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| Wellington at Salamanca |
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| Line Infantry passes in review in front of Bonaparte and the Imperial Guard |
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| Heavy Cavalry of Cuirassier and Dragoons leads the column in review |
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| The whole parade route in one photo. |
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| Napoleon, the Marshals and Imperial Guard were the reviewing dais |
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| A hot day again on the parade route, many years on and this Dragoon officer is still leading columns in my collection |
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