tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-34346082.post2657062112229081800..comments2024-02-21T12:43:58.833-08:00Comments on MurdocK's MarauderS: La manoeuver sur les derrieresMurdocKhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08693711825249632305noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-34346082.post-40729227740813796732014-09-23T11:09:13.717-07:002014-09-23T11:09:13.717-07:00I had not viewed the dash from the Boulonge coast ...I had not viewed the dash from the Boulonge coast as such a maneuver, though I can see that bu using the Danube as the first barrier, and perhaps one of the southern tributaries as the rear barrier it could be seen as such.<br /><br />For the American Civil War, there were many that attempted to re-use the Napoleonic strategies and tactics. The problem with them all was the increase in firepower and rates of fire had not been taken into account. Moreover there were no officers like the Marshalate or well trained and experienced NCO's to keep up the morale on the march. Not until Sherman was on his epic march were the officers and NCO up to the level needed to accomplish such complex maneuvers, and by then the Union did not need such finesse.<br /><br />Thank you for the thought-filled comment.MurdocKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08693711825249632305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-34346082.post-18536612658767333822014-09-22T14:29:31.715-07:002014-09-22T14:29:31.715-07:00This strategy was devastatingly successful at Ulm ...This strategy was devastatingly successful at Ulm in 1805 - possibly its crowning achievement. It was also the basis of Ambrose Burnside's plan after the Fredericksburg debacle, but was stymied by Virginia's winter weather. Joe Hooker thought well enough of it to try it on in May 1863, and had he pushed it home, might have won a signal victory at Chancellorsville.<br /><br />The "manoeuvre sur les derrieres" was a strategy best suited to superior numbers. Robert E. Lee got away with its application with inferior numbers in the Second Manassas campaign, but was less successful with it in the Gettysburg campaign and some months later in Virginia. I believe the vast inferiority in resources told against a decisive CSA success.<br /><br />I'm inclined to think of U.S. Grant's closing operations around Vicksburg also as such a manoeuvre, rather creatively applied. This really was decisive: once encircled (contrary to Joe Johnston's wishes and orders), Pemberton's army had no chance. Archduke Piccolohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15533325665451889661noreply@blogger.com